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NANCY J. KING

Lafler v. Cooper and AEDPA
The Supreme Court in Missouri v. Frye' and Lafler v. Cooper' broke new
ground by holding for the first time that a defendant's right to the effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment can be violated by the loss of
a favorable plea deal. Less noted, but also worthy of attention, are Lafler's
implications for federal habeas law. Four Justices protested that the Lafler
decision violated the federal habeas statute. At the least, the decision expanded
habeas review in unexpected ways.
Lafler presented the Supreme Court with an unusual opportunity to declare
new doctrine on habeas review. First, the State had conceded that the
performance of respondent Anthony Cooper's lawyer was deficient under the
first prong of Strickland v. Washington'- a point not easily demonstrated in
most habeas cases because of the deference afforded strategic decisions. 4
Second, the Court managed to avoid what would have been a difficult hurdle
for the petitioner to clear in seeking relief under § 22 54 (d) (1), the provision of
the habeas statute that conditions relief upon a showing that the state decision
was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States."s The state court's vague wording allowed the Court to characterize the
state decision as "contrary to" Strickland and to bypass the issue of whether it
was an "unreasonable application" of Strickland.

1.

No. 1o-444 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/nlpdf/lo-444.pdf
(to be reported at 132 S. Ct. 1399).

2.

No. 10-209 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/npdf/1o-209.pdf
(to be reported at 13 2 S. Ct. 1376).

3.

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

4.

See id. at 689-91.

5.

28 U.S.C. § 225 4 (d)(1) (2006).
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The Court's opinion in Lafler turned on the following two paragraphs of
the state court decision:
To establish ineffective assistance, the defendant must
demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that counsel's representation so
prejudiced the defendant that he was deprived of a fair trial. With
respect to the prejudice aspect of the test, the defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
the result of the proceedings would have been different, and that the
attendant proceedings were fundamentally unfair and unreliable.
Defendant challenges the trial court's finding ... that defense
counsel provided effective assistance to defendant during the plea
bargaining process. He contends that defense counsel failed to
convey the benefits of the plea offer to him and ignored his desire to
plead guilty, and that these failures led him to reject a plea offer that
he now wishes to accept. However, the record shows that defendant
knowingly and intelligently rejected two plea offers and chose to go
to trial. The record fails to support defendant's contentions that
defense counsel's representation was ineffective because he rejected a
defense based on [a] claim of self-defense and because he did not
obtain a more favorable plea bargain for defendant.'
The five Justices in the Lafler majority concluded that this decision was
"contrary to" Strickland, because in their view it failed entirely to apply the
case: "Rather than applying Strickland, the state court simply found that
respondent's rejection of the plea was knowing and voluntary. An inquiry into
whether the rejection of a plea is knowing and voluntary, however, is not the
correct means by which to address a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." 7
The state court, in the majority's view, "applie[d] a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases."
By contrast, the four dissenting Justices read the second paragraph of the
state court's analysis as that court's application of the Strickland standard. The
state court's statement that "defendant knowingly and intelligently rejected

6.

People v. Cooper, No. 250583, 2005 WL 599740, at *1

(Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2005)

(footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
7.

Lafler, slip op. at 14-15 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).

8.

Id. at 14 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (opinion of O'Connor,
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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two plea offers and chose to go to trial," the dissenters explained, "can be
regarded as a denial that there was anything 'fundamentally unfair' about
Cooper's conviction and sentence, so that no Strickland prejudice had been
shown." 9 Because it referenced and applied the correct test, they reasoned, the
decision was not contrary to established federal law. Furthermore, this opinion
was not an "unreasonable application[] of clearly established law," the
dissenters argued, "since this Court has never held that a defendant in Cooper's
position can establish Strickland prejudice." 0
Had the state court used language more easily read as rejecting Cooper's
claim under Strickland's prejudice standard, the majority would not have had
the option of characterizing the state decision as "contrary to" Strickland."
Instead, the Court would have had to explain why the state decision was an
unreasonable application of Strickland. And under that standard, Cooper would
have lost. It would have been reasonable, before Lafler, for a state court to
decide that it was not "prejudice" under Strickland to end up with a fair trial
and legal sentence after missing out on a more favorable plea deal because of
counsel's incompetence. No decision of the Supreme Court had held that the
Sixth Amendment protected defendants from losing plea deals, as opposed to
fair trials, sentencing proceedings, or appeals," and several of the Court's
decisions had pointed in the other direction.

J.,

9.

Id. at 9 (Scalia,

dissenting).

10.

Id. at to.

n1.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("Assume, for example, that a statecourt decision on a prisoner's ineffective-assistance claim correctly identifies Strickland as
the controlling legal authority and, applying that framework, rejects the prisoner's claim.
Quite clearly, the state-court decision would be in accord with our decision in Strickland as
to the legal prerequisites for establishing an ineffective-assistance claim [and thus would not
be "contrary to" Strickland] even assuming the federal court considering the prisoner's
habeas application might reach a different result applying the Strickland framework itself.").

12.

It takes a holding by the Supreme Court to clearly establish federal law under § 22 54 (d). See
28 U.S.C. §22 5 4 (d)(1)
(20o6) (requiring the "clearly established federal law" be
"determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"); see also Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S.
Ct. 1171, 1175 (2010) (" [N]o decision of this Court clearly establishes the categorical rule on
which the Court of Appeals appears to have relied."); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. iII,
122 (2009) ("With no Supreme Court precedent establishing a 'nothing to lose' standard for
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, habeas relief cannot be granted pursuant to
§ 225 4 (d)(1) based on such a standard."); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008)
("No decision of this Court, however, squarely addresses the issue in this case or clearly
establishes [a new standard] in this novel factual context." (citation omitted)).

13.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-93; Lockhartv. Fretwell, 5o6 U.S. 364, 369-372 (1993); Nix v.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,186-87 (1986); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977).
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Consider, by contrast, what would have happened had the Court decided to
review a federal habeas challenge to a state decision in which the state court
rejected a claim like Cooper's, but had more clearly relied on Strickland in its
reasoning and interpreted Strickland as did the Lafler dissenters. In order to
grant habeas relief in such a case, the Court first would have had to conclude
that the position held by four Justices (assuming Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas would have taken the same position on the
merits of the Sixth Amendment question), a unanimous Utah Supreme
Court,4 and at least four court of appeals judges," was "unreasonable" under
§ 22 54 (d) - that is, "so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement."" Not likely.
Indeed, a petitioner who had challenged a state court decision that said
virtually nothing except "denied," after a bare citation of the correct Supreme
Court precedent, would have had a much more difficult time than Cooper did
convincing a federal court that the decision was "contrary to" established
federal law, and would instead have had to meet Richter's exacting
"unreasonable application" standard. As the Court explained in Richter,
"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the
habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable
basisfor the state court to deny relief"17 In short, but for the unusual combination
of ambiguous reasoning by the state court and admitted incompetence in
Lafler, the Supreme Court probably would have had to save its development of
the constitutional regulation of representation during the plea process for a
different case - an appeal of either a state postconviction decision (like Frye and

14.

State v. Greuber, 165 P- 3 d 1185, 1189 (Utah 2007) (concluding that "a fair trial for the

defendant generally negates the possibility of prejudice" under Strickland).
15.

See Williams v. Jones, 583 F. 3d 1254 (ioth Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (" [N]o decision from the United States Supreme Court has ever held (or
even hinted) that a lawyer's bad advice to reject a plea offer gives rise to a violation of the
Sixth Amendment, or any other provision of federal law. Neither does a conventional

Strickland analysis compel such a novel result."). The Seventh Circuit also appeared to
anticipate that the question was a close one. See Kerr v. Thurmer, 639 F. 3 d 315 (7 th Cir.
2011) ("We think it best to move forward now, recognizing that if the Court rules that the

later trial erases any possible claim relating to potential plea bargains, then it is likely that
Kerr's case will have to be dismissed at that time."), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1791 (remanding the
case for further consideration in light of Lafler).
16.

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011).

1.

Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
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Padilla v. Kentucky8) or a decision under § 2255,19 where the "unreasonable
application" standard of § 22 54 (d) would not apply.
On its face, Lafler's "contrary to" analysis leaves the daunting
"unreasonable application" standard of Richter in place -both decisions were
authored by Justice Kennedy, and the Court carefully avoided discussion of the
"unreasonable application" standard. But the decision in Lafler appears to have
loosened the "contrary to" standard a notch for future cases, encouraging
petitioners to argue that the state court never applied the correct federal
precedent (even when that precedent is cited or described), instead of arguing
than that the court's application of federal law was unreasonable. The
combination of Lafler and Richter also suggests that when reviewing state court
criminal opinions, "less is more" - a summary state denial will not be disturbed
unless all possible (hypothetical) applications would have been unreasonable,
while a merits decision accompanied by an ambiguously phrased rationale that
could be construed as failing to apply the correct rule is vulnerable to attack.20
The best news for prisoners bringing Frye and Lafler claims from now on,
however, is that by announcing its interpretation of Strickland in a federal
habeas case, the Court in Lafler necessarily applied that rule retroactively.
Generally the habeas remedy is limited to violations of federal law that were
clearly established at the time the state court denied relief to the petitioner;
retroactive enforcement of new rules announced only later is prohibited." This
means that any controversial decision for defendants announced by the
Supreme Court on appeal is inevitably followed by a battle over whether that
decision was clearly established by earlier Supreme Court precedent and thus is
available as a basis for relief for any habeas petitioner whose state court
decision postdated that earlier Supreme Court precedent. For example, when
the Court in Padilla announced the qualified Sixth Amendment right to
competent pre-plea advice concerning deportation, it did so in an appeal from a

18.

130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).

19.

28 U.S.C. §

20.

I do not mean to suggest here that Lafler will actually prompt more state courts to "withhold
explanations for their decisions." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. I agree with the Richter Court that
"[o]pinion-writing practices in state courts are influenced by considerations other than
avoiding scrutiny by collateral attack in federal court." Id.

21.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) (prohibiting relief from a state decision that rejected the merits of
a federal claim unless the decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established Supreme Court precedent); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (permitting no
retroactive application of "new rules" of constitutional criminal procedure, with two narrow
exceptions). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S.
KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6 ( 3 d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2011).

2255 (2006)

(governing collateral review of convictions of federal prisoners).
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state postconviction decision, not in a federal habeas case. Lower courts soon
divided over whether or not that rule was clearly established by either
Strickland or Hill before the Padilla decision2 and the Court has now agreed to
resolve the issue in its upcoming term.' The same sort of litigation followed
the Court's decisions in Crawfordv. Washington5 and Ring v. Arizona.21
By affirming the grant of habeas relief for Cooper under § 22 54 (d), the
Court appears to have assumed that its foregone-plea doctrine was "clearly
established" at least as far back as 2005, when the Michigan Court of Appeals
rejected Cooper's claim of ineffective assistance. That is undoubtedly
surprising news to the divided judges of the Tenth Circuit, to the justices of the
Utah Supreme Court, and to those who believed that under § 2254 (d), habeas
corpus would "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice
systems," not "substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." 2 7 But it
is welcome news for any petitioner whose foregone-plea claim was rejected by
a state court in the past seven years.
'

Nancy J. King is the Lee S. and CharlesA. Speir Professor ofLaw at Vanderbilt
University Law School.
Preferred citation: Nancy J. King, Lafler v. Cooper and AEDPA, 122
29 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2ol2/o6/19/king.html.
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22.

See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.

23.

See, e.g., Danielle M. Lang, Note, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect ofPlea Colloquy Warnings on
Defendants'Ability To Bring Successful PadillaClaims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 965-75 (2012).

24.

See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F. 3 d 684 ( 7 th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL 1468539
(U.S. Apr. 30, 2012) (No. 11-820).

25.

See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (holding Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), to not
be retroactive).

26.

See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (refusing to find that the rule of Ring, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), entitling a defendant to a jury determination of facts that state law requires
must be found before a death sentence may be imposed, would fit within an exception to

Teague). The Court has yet to address whether the rule in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004), applies retroactively. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (declining to

reach the question).
27.

34

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)).

